Communal Autonomy and the Application of Islamic Law by Ahmed, I.
Law and Society3 2 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  1 0 / 0 2
E u r o p e
I S H T I A Q  AH ME D
Islamic organizations, claiming to represent the in-
terests of the 8 to 9 million-strong Muslim immigrant
communities in Western Europe, have been asserting
a human rights claim to communal autonomy to
apply Islamic law, the s h a r ica, to their family or per-
sonal matters. Always included among the latter are
marriage, divorce and inheritance. 
Communal Autonomy
and the Application
o f Islamic Law 
In 1975, Sheikh Syed Darsh, the head cleric
of the Regent's Park Mosque in London, said: 
When a Muslim is prevented from
obeying this law he feels that he is failing
to fulfil a religious duty. He will not feel at
peace with the conscience or the
environment in which he lives and this
will lead to disenchantment. [É] They
[that is Muslims] believe that the British
society, with its rich experience of
different cultures and ways of life,
especially the Islamic way of life which
they used to see in India, Malaysia,
Nigeria and so many other nations of
Islamic orientation, together with their
respect for personal and communal
freedom, will enable the Muslim migrants
to realize their entity within the freedom
of British society. When we request the
host society to recognize our point of
view we are appealing to a tradition of
justice and equity well established in this
country. The scope of the family law is not
wide and does not contradict, in essence,
the law here in this country. Both aim at
the fulfilment of justice and happiness of
the members of the family. Still, there are
certain Islamic points which, with
understanding and the spirit of
accommodation, would not go so far as
to create difficulties in the judiciary
system. After all, we are asking for their
application among themselves, the
Muslim community, as our Christian
brothers in Islamic countries are
following in the family traditions and the
Christian point of view. The Qur'an itself
has given them this right. (Quoted in
Nielsen 1993: 1Ð2)
Contrary to the assertion of the learned
cleric, it will be argued below that such au-
tonomy would create serious legal, philo-
sophical-theoretical and political problems
related to current Western notions of justice
and equity. 
Family matters
The recognized schools of Islamic ju-
risprudence (f i q h) regard marriage as a cen-
tral institution of Muslim society. In legal
terms marriage is not a sacred bond but a
civil contract between two free individuals.
However, the consent of the guardian to a
marriage is considered necessary by some
jurists, while others do not consider it oblig-
atory for an adult female. A girl may not be
coerced into marrying someone of whom
she does not approve, but since traditional
law does not prescribe an age limit, even
very young individuals can be married. In
such a case, it devolves upon the guardian
(normally the parents) to decide the terms
of the contract.
A Muslim male may have simultaneously
up to four wives. Such a right is not subject
to any limitations. A man can dissolve mar-
riage by pronouncing his intention to do so
three times. There are different ways of
doing it, but in principle a man can secure
divorce at will even when he is advised to
seek reconciliation (Amin 1989: 77). Women
can apply for divorce under exceptional cir-
cumstances. Allegations of cruelty, insanity
and impotence are strong cases for de-
manding divorce. However, it does not
mean that a woman can secure divorce at
will. Normally she has to be ready to pay an
agreed sum of money to the husband who
must agree to her proposal (Doi 1984:
192Ð7). The s h a r ica does not allow Muslims
to marry polytheists or atheists. However, a
Muslim male may marry a woman from
among the people of the book, that is, Jews,
Christians and a now extinct sect, the Sabi-
ans. Twelver S h ici s m allows marriage to a
Zoroastrian female. On the other hand, a
Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim.
As regards inheritance, both male and fe-
male dependents and close relatives are
given a share in the property of the de-
ceased. Besides the shares of different
wives, the distribution among the children
of a deceased father follows the principle
that the female children inherit one-half of
the share of male children. Further, while
Muslim wives are entitled to a share, non-
Muslim wives are not. However, through a
will or testament the husband can gift some
property to his non-Muslim wife. Property of
a Muslim may not be inherited by non-Mus-
lim children or parents. The property of an
apostate cannot be inherited nor can the
property of a Muslim be passed on to an
apostate (Ibid.: 289Ð91). As regards children
born out of wedlock, according to the
Hanafi School (the biggest and considered
the most liberal) the illicit child cannot in-
herit from the father but may inherit from
the mother's side. Moreover, children of a
deceased son are excluded from inheriting
the property from the grandfather. Instead
the share is distributed among the siblings
of the deceased son. Finally, although Mus-
lims are encouraged to take care of orphans,
there is no right to adopt a child. Thus an
adopted child cannot inherit property of the
adoptive parents (Amin 1989: 81Ð82). On
the other hand, a part of the property can be
left to such a child through a testament.
It is quite clear that the s h a r ica laws per-
taining to family matters differ radically
from the European systems. For example,
only the monogamous form of marriage is
legally recognized in Europe. Any restric-
tions on marriage between a Muslim and a
non-Muslim cannot be condoned by a Euro-
pean legal system because the Western
states have ratified the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (1979) which
envisages equality between the sexes on all
matters. Article 16 unequivocally places
women on a par with men in matters of mar-
riage and allows them freely to chose a
spouse. Similarly divorce, the rights of the
child (born within or outside of wedlock), in-
heritance and adoption are matters on
which traditional discriminatory practices
have been eliminated.
Moreover, serious procedural questions
arise with regard to the practical application
of the s h a r ica. Who would be competent to
interpret and enforce Muslim family law?
Can non-Muslim judges be competent
enough to consider cases involving Islamic
law or should the state set up separate
courts with Muslim judges to try cases in-
volving disputes over family matters? Even
more intractable would be problems stem-
ming from mixed marriages. Additionally,
there is a distinct possibility that some Mus-
lims may prefer to seek redress from the
mainstream legal system or, worse still, the
conflicting parties may appeal to the two
different legal systems. Who should decide
which court is appropriate for a Muslim?
Communal authority
In a theoretical and philosophical sense,
the demand for communal autonomy poses
serious challenges to current understand-
ings of multiculturalism and pluralism. S h a r-
ica rulings on family matters are under-
pinned by ontological and epistemological
values which identify community and reve-
lation as superior to the individual and rea-
son. In sharp contrast, Western European
legal systems have been reformed in the
light of the Enlightenment values of ratio-
nality and secular humanism. The human
rights of individuals are a centrepiece of
such reformed law. How these diametrically
opposite approaches can be reconciled into
a coherent system of law is a matter on
which more serious work needs to be done.
In political terms, it is quite clear that any
concession to Muslim separatism under the
garb of communal autonomy will provoke a
reaction deriving from xenophobia, in gen-
eral, and Islamophobia, in particular.
It is worth noting that even among Mus-
lim states there is no agreement on how to
apply the s h a r ica, including its rulings on
family matters. Saudi Arabia and Iran apply
the s h a r ica in a complete sense. Mauritania,
Libya and Egypt in principle but not consis-
tently in practice base their legal praxis on
the s h a r ica. The United Arab Emirates, Oman
and Pakistan recognize the s h a r ica as the
supreme law of the land, but deviate from it
in practice. Twenty countries retain s h a r ica
courts for personal law, while fourteen
make reference to it in personal law codifi-
cations. Nine countries have abolished all
reference to the s h a r ica. These include
Eritrea, Senegal, Turkey, and the former So-
viet republics having a Muslim majority, in-
cluding Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan. 
It must be remembered that current
human rights were won by deprived and dis-
enfranchised people through long-drawn
mass struggles. The French Revolution con-
verted obligation-bound subjects of the
monarchy into rights-bearing citizens of a
republic. Initially it was propertied men
from the majority communities who could
enjoy the rights of citizenship. Poor men, re-
ligious and ethnic minorities and women
were extended such rights much later: uni-
versal citizenship is a post-World War II phe-
nomenon. It would be ironic and tragic if in
the name of communal autonomy claimed
by conservative Islamic organizations, Mus-
lim men and women were deprived rights
that other citizens or permanent residents
of Western societies enjoy. The Western Eu-
ropean states have shown understanding of
and sympathy towards demands for permis-
sion to build mosques and maintain special
graveyards. Such matters are truly of a per-
sonal nature. However, marriage, divorce
and inheritance are matters which require
justice and equity for everyone on a univer-
sal basis. Islam established impressive stan-
dards of justice and rights in the 7t h c e n t u r y
but Muslims need to catch up with develop-
ments on the world stage. It is high time to
debunk dubious claims to cultural authen-
ticity as a legitimate basis for human rights,
and instead engage Muslims in a dialogue
for partnership in a world order based on
equal and universal rights. 
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